Abstract
Introduction
During 2011-2016, the number of claims through Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism encountered by Indonesian government increased. It can be seen in the table year 1920-2009 (19 years) there were only 6 cases whereas during 2011-2016 (5 years) 5 cases were found. Several recorded cases were Ravat Ali Rizvi case, Churchill Mining and Planet Mining case, Newmont Nusantara BV case, Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd (IMFA) case, and Oleovest Pte. Ltd case. Below is official report by BPKM (Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board) in 2013-2016. There were 67 BIT. In detail, there were 20 unjustified BIT, terminated 25 BIT, and the rest 22 are still applied and reviewed for its sustainability. 5 The first BIT stopped was the BIT with Dutch that were effectively applied since 1 July 2015.
The government policy to terminate and review the BIT gains many supports. It is because the more commitment numbers in IIA, the more potentials to be claimed in ISDS. IIA contains minimum standards of investment protection which must be given by the host state:
9 first, an equal and fair treatment or a treatment with no discrimination from any investment types whether it is domestic or foreign; second, a full protection and security containing state obligation to give compensation upon the corporation loss due to war, armed conflict, revolution, state emergency, riot or rebellion. This protection is usually in form of compensation or recovery; third, a protection from any action or nationalization and an obligation to give compensation; fourth, mechanism of dispute settlement which aligns the investor and the state level known as "Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).
ISDS is minimum standard which must exist in IIA. ISDS is not an agreement which is directly made between host state and investor. Instead, it is made by home state with the host state embodied in IIA.
10 ISDS aims to be an effective mechanism of dispute settlement that However, ISDS is perceived to undermine the democratic norm, violate personal rights and public rights that develop in domestic context, and destroy the state sovereignty. According to this party, the domestic court should be the proper institution to rule the public, environmental, security, safety and social interests rather than ISDS court.
12
This reminds us of the Calvo doctrine in 19th century which prioritizes the host state sovereignty and refuses the home state intervention in dispute settlement between investor with host state.
13 Another criticism to ISDS is the risk of many claims proposed by investor to the host state with its value reaching out US $ 1 billion. Besides, the case high expense can be charged to host state even in case of their winning.
Furthermore, there has been a perception that ISDS is the determinant factor of the Foreign direct investment (FDI) entry. Nevertheless, some research show different result that it is not.
14 The increased policy transparency, market access, removal of Investment Negative List, license simplification, and regulation certainty are considered more important. ISDS is not the initial determinant of important investment, but it becomes important as the last attempt if the relation between states gets worse.
15
The criticism toward ISDS is getting wider since the withdrawal of several South American countries such as Bolivia, Equador and Venezuela from ICSID forum. It is a reaction of many 11 Martina A. Weiss, et. al, 2015, International Investment Agreement (IIAS) claims toward their policies conducted by the investor in ICSID forum. 16 It is inferred from the explanation above that indeed there are many pros and cons towards the IIA and ISDS existence for the host state. Yet as long as Indonesia is still in need of foreign capital then the IIA and ISDS existence is still urgent, in the context of Indonesia. The other Indonesia's competitor states that also need the foreign investment are facilitating or providing IIA and ISDS as well. IIA and ISDS are the instrument of international law which tied two parties up, either the investor or the state. The IIA and ISDS existence secure the foreign investor since they will obtain the protection assurance of their investment in Indonesia from the arbitrary nationalization action, discrimination, and other unfair treatments. Even so, IIA and ISDS need a particular format, not like the current one that is investor-biased and disadvantaging Indonesian business. Even Indonesian investors abroad also need such protection guarantee from their host states.
The Model of IIA and ISDS for Indonesia
Indonesian action in terminating and reviewing IIA and ISDS is already precise. World's trend also shows the same causes. Many states have modified their IIA to protect more their host state's sovereignty comprehensively, to minimize the misuse the ISDS risk and to give more state's autonomy in pursuing its people prosperity. 17 Several new IIA models done by some host states can be a reference to arrange the new IIA and ISDS format of for Indonesia. International Law, Minn. J. Int'l L. Vol. 26 No. 273, winter 2017, p. 273 the investment law applied in India, as well as obliging investor using the exhaustion of local remedies at least 5 years before using ISDS.
18
Local remedies doctrine was known in 1970s-1980s, but then it was forgotten. An arbitration clause like ICSID is interpreted as an obligation dismantling of local remedies. A few part of IIA is still required obligation of exhausttion local remedies by approximately 18 months of time limitation.
19 It is actually unfair if we look on how in ISDS, the solving of such case takes more than 4 years in average. 20 The benefit gained by obliging the exhaustion of local remedies employment in IIA is to push the national law to improve the law system and its justice; to ease ISDS in giving qualified decision because arbitrary ISDS can learn the national law through national court's decision; to set the investor equally to the citizen, without any privilege; and to help clarify as well as integrate the role of domestic court and ISDS arbitration.
India's new BIT model does not contain MFN conditions. In addition, it forbids treaty shopping as well. Although this model is more host-state friendly, it still provides investor's protection. India is still actively integrating with the global economy and negotiating IIA which gives India autonomy and protection towards the claims potentials through ISDS
21
The second IIA model is given by Canada which was triggered by the case of Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada. Canada was prosecuted by Lone Pine Resources because An Act to limit oil and gas activities launched by Quebec. The licenses of exploration in St. Lawrence River was called off including Lone Pine Resources' license.
22 The Quebec's action was intended to protect the environment around the river. 23 In response to this case, Canada stated that this action was legally a sovereign state action without any discrimination. It aims to protect St. Lawrence Ibid. Online, Vol. 41 No. 1, fall 2015, p. 4. 20 Ibid, p. 11.
Ibid.
22
23
ver and cannot be considered as an arbitration, unfair or inequitable measure.
24
In 2015, IIA of Canada and the European Commission (CETA) gave a flexibility to make legitimate policy, recognition on the importance of international security, democracy, and human right in order to improve the trading and international economy cooperation. CETA made sure that investor's protection must not ignore the importance of protecting country's sovereignty.
25
The third model is what Australia has. Similarly to Canada's case, Australia was prosecuted by Phillip Morris to UNCITRAL because their Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 was considered violating the regulation on Article 2 (2) and Article 6 on the Hong Kong-Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty (1993) 26 about "fair and equitable treatment" and the indirect expropriation of investments without adequate compensation. Australia refused all prosecution from Phillip Morris and stated that the purpose of The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 was to protect people's health. Although they won, Australia still launched more than fifty million dollars for the court fee. 27 Learning from this case, CHAFTA tried to make several changes on IIA and ISDS process in their will to protect host state's right in arranging society's prosperity legitimately through non-discriminating regulation.
The Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia case inspired and influenced the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) arrangement. In this case, although there are still many controversies which make many parties shout to many states to not take parts in this agreement, TPP has done several changes related to the direct expropriation and indirect expropriation definetion, especially related to state's right to protect public interests.
28
The new BIT model is also set by New Zealand that made IIA without ISDS clause. It aims to decrease the investor's claim risk to 24 Nikesh Patel, op.cit, p. 290. 25 Ibid, p. 292.
26
Michael Nolan, "Challenge to the Credibility of the Investor state arbitration system", Am. U. Bus. L. Rev., Vol. 5 No. 429, 2015, p.430 27 Nikesh Patel, op.cit., p. 296. 28 Ibid ISDS. For New Zealand, the litigation risk can be managed through substantive conditions in the investment agreement.
29 Even so, this practice got many criticism because the state's commitment in IIA without containing ISDS is doubted. How it is possible for IIA to promise the investor mutually substantive treatment without giving them rights to access international arbitration. It is the same as not providing law protection from host state's behavior which might be opportunistic. 30 The alternative offered by the author is by fixing the BIT by improving ISDS clause which is not automatically applied. Yet, it is going to be determined later in a separated arbitration agreement after the dispute appears based on all parties' deal. Besides, in Indonesia's new BIT model, it is going to be better if the exhaustion local remedies is applied 5 years before it is brought to ICSID forum. This aims to give a chance for Indonesian court to handle it.
Conclusion
The IIA and ISDS existence is still urgent for Indonesia due to the need of foreign investment related to the limit of Indonesian capability in the terms of capital, technology, and human resources. IIA and ISDS are going to give protection guarantee, law certainty and justice to the investor. The current IIA and ISDS need reformulation which gives balance towards host state's interest as well as investor's personal interest.
Indonesia's new IIA and ISDS model can refer to similar the other host states' instrument, especially India, as the same developing countries. Indonesia's new BIT should reformulate the terms which are given a very open definition and can be interpreted widely this whole time, as well as applying obligation of exhaustion of local remedies. Furthermore, the pointing of ISDS arbitration must be taken with mutual consent (not automatically), no fake MFN clauses, and give host state nation's flex-29 ibility to protect the society's prosperity through non-discriminating regulations to get society's prosperity, health, safety, environment, public moral, and public order. Indonesia needs to review and make a new IIA and ISDS format model which balances the investor's and host state's interests.
